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AN APOLOGY FOR APOLOGETICS 
Paul J. Griffiths 
Prolegomena 
It has become a truism (though none the less true for that) to say that the world has 
grown smaller; that the community within which each of us lives is no longer the 
church or the nation, but the world; and that Christian theology as an intellectual 
discipline cannot legitimately be done without making the realization of these 
things central to its practice. 1 Those who say this the loudest are, however, often 
the last to offer a serious treatment of the pressing intellectual problems that such a 
realization brings. How is systematic theology to be practiced if the tradition-based 
norms that have shaped it are placed in (and relativized by) a context ofradical 
religious pluralism? What is the status and validity of Christian ethical and meta-
ethical theory in such a context? What, in such a context, can the adjective 'Chris-
tian' mean? Is it genuinely possible to engage in constructive theological thought 
comparatively?2 These are large questions, to none of which I know the answers. 
I certainly don't intend to enter into a systematic treatment of any of them here. 
Instead, I'd like to explore, in a fair amount of detail and with as much precision 
as I can muster, one small preliminary question: what is the nature and status of 
the discipline of inter-religious apologetics? 
This may seem an odd question to choose as a prolegomenon to the broader and 
more difficult questions mentioned. Apologetics is a term laden with many nega-
tive connotations; to be an apologist for the truth of one religious claim or set of 
religious claims over against another is, in certain circles, seen as not far short of 
being a racist. 3 In almost all mainstream institutions in which theology is taught in 
the USA, apologetics as an intellectual discipline does not figure prominently in 
the curriculum. You'll look for it in vain in the catalogues of the Divinity Schools 
at Harvard or Chicago. Liberal Protestants have never been wedded to the virtues 
of apologetics, and, as a broad generalization, the Roman Catholic tradition of 
systematic apologetics appears to have been killed by the Second Vatican Council 
and especially by Nostra Aetate. Why then choose it? A detailed justification of 
the choice is in the paper that follows. As a preliminary defence: it appears to me 
that a proper understanding of the status and importance of inter-religious apolo-
getics will be of enormous help in clarifying the significance of theological claims 
to truth made in a pluralistic context. And this, in tum, will have significant 
implications for the broader systematic questions mentioned. 
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The Necessity of Inter-Religious Apologetics (NOlA) 
I wish to defend the thesis that inter-religious apologetics is a necessary com-
ponent of theology done in a multi-cultural, religiously plural context. And since 
this is now the only context within which theology can properly be done, I shall 
also be defending the thesis that theology simpliciter needs apologetics. More 
formally, the thesis for which I wish to argue is: 
For any two religious communities, Rl and Rb any two ordered sets 
of sentences, SI and S2' and any time, T: If SI and S2 are doctrines of 
R1 and R2 , and if, at T, representative intellectuals of R1 come to judge 
that some members of S2 are incompatible with some members of SI 
(or that S2 and S1 in toto are incompatible), then the representative 
intellectuals in question should feel obliged to engage in both positive 
and negative apologetics vis-a-vis S2' 
Let's call this the principle of the necessity of inter-religious apologetics (the NOlA 
principle). Its constituent terms need a little explanation. First, by 'ordered set of 
sentences' I mean any collection of sentences ordered in such a way that what they 
express constitutes a conceptual system in some sphere of discourse, and is recog-
nized as such by its users. The American oath of allegiance would be one such 
ordered set; the sphere of discourse in this case would be the individual citizen's 
proper relations to the state. The sutras comprising Piil'!ini' s A~!iidhyiiyf would be 
another; the sphere of discourse here is that of the rules governing the formation of 
semantic items from (notional) roots in the Sanskrit language. 
By 'religious community' I mean any group of persons who would, severally 
and collectively, acknowledge themselves to be members of some community 
which is recognizably religious. Most individuals who would so describe them-
selves recognize that their membership in any given religious community operates 
on a number of levels and that the requirements for entry and continuation are 
likely to differ at each level. For example, a Gelukpa Tibetan Buddhist monk 
resident in some specific monastery in 1949 would have been likely to identify 
himself first as a member of some specific monastic community, then as affiliated 
to a particular scholastic lineage, and finally as (most broadly of all) a Buddhist. 
It would be possible to specify fairly precisely what it took to become a member 
of a specific monastic community in Tibet in 1949, as well as what it took to 
remain one; it would be much more difficult to specify the constraints upon 
becoming and remaining a Buddhist, in 1949 in Tibet or in any other time and 
place. Similar considerations would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the requirements 
for entering any specific Christian community and for maintaining oneself as a 
member thereof. There will always be difficult marginal instances, and, especially 
in the case of multi-cultural, polyglot, semi-fictional entities like 'Buddhism' or 
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'Christianity,' some systematic theoretical difficulties in determining who is a 
member of which religious community and why. But for the purposes of this 
study such nice issues of delineation and demarcation need not be of concern. 
The NOlA principle suggests that religious communities (and, by implication, 
their members) typically have religious doctrines, and that such doctrines may be 
(and are) expressed in ordered sets of sentences. Some traditions have made a virtue 
of constructing confessional formulae out of such sets, and have used these formulae 
in various ritual settings. Such, for example, is the Nicene creed, recited (or 
chanted or sung) in many Christian communities. Such also is the classical twelve-
fold pratityasamutpiida formula, learned, chanted, and represented iconographic-
ally in many Buddhist traditions. The NOlA principle also suggests that it is pos-
sible for a sentence that expresses a doctrine of one religious community to be 
incompatible with a sentence that expresses a doctrine of another. Such incompati-
bility may have many forms.4 In the case of sentences that express claims about 
the nature ofthe universe or of specific existents within it, it may be strictly logical: 
if what is expressed by one sentence is true, what is expressed by the other cannot 
be. An example might be the prima facie incompatibility between the Buddhist 
assertion everything that exists does so momentarily5 and the Christian assertion 
Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday, today andforever. 6 In the case of sentences 
that recommend courses of action, incompatibility may be practical: that it is not 
possible for a single individual to consistently follow both courses of action. For 
example, there may be an incompatibility of this kind between the (Buddhist) 
recommendation of the ceaseless practice of mindfulness (smr:tyupasthiina), and 
the (Christian) recommendation that all actions should be done for the greater 
glory of God. 7 
It should be noted that the NOlA principle requires, in order to come into 
operation, only that some representative intellectuals of a given religious commu-
nity should come to judge that there is an incompatibility of one of the kinds 
mentioned, not that there actually is. The phrase 'representative intellectuals' is 
inserted in order not to place too great a burden upon the doxastic practices of 
ordinary (non-intellectual, non-professional) members of religious communities. 
I do not intend to claim that every member of a religious community who finds 
herself in the situation described by the NOlA principle is thereby required to 
engage in apologetics; only that every religious community should have some 
individuals among its members who respond in this way. The NOlA principle 
is thus clearly normative in intent, but its normativeness bears upon communities 
rather than individuals. 
The meaning of 'positive apologetics' and 'negative apologetics' now needs 
to be clarified. I understand apologetics in general as an occasional and polemical 
intellectual discourse which operates in two quite distinctive modalities. The 
first is negative: in this mode, apologetical discourse is designed to show that a 
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given critique of (anyone of) the central truth-claims expressed by an ordered 
set of doctrine-expressing sentences fails, or that a critique of the set as a whole 
(as to, say, its consistence or coherence) does the same. Suppose that someone 
from outside the Buddhist tradition presents an argument purporting to show that 
two key doctrine-expressing sentences from within the tradition-say, the claim 
there are no spiritual substances and the claim each person is reborn many 
times-issue in a contradiction if taken together. A Buddhist defender of the 
faith will usually try to mend fences by showing that no such contradiction 
issues, or that some important misunderstanding of the sentences in question has 
occurred. 8 This is negative apologetics in action. Standard-issue Christian 
responses to the problem of evil9 tend to be of the same logical kind. 
Positive apologetics is both more complex and more interesting: it is a discourse 
designed to show that the ordered set of doctrine-expressing sentences constituting 
a particular religious community's doctrines is cognitively superior, in some 
important respect(s), to that constituting anotherreligious community's doctrines. 
Where negative apologetics is defensive, positive apologetics is offensive; where 
negative apologetics mans the barricades, positive apologetics takes the battle 
to the enemy's camp.1O Positive apologetics is, by its very nature, part of an 
evidentialist program; it often tries to show, by cumulative-case arguments, that 
the conceptual system it is attempting to establish is more likely than not (or 
more likely than some specific competitor) to be true, both in its parts and as a 
whole." It may also (though more rarely) try to provide a knock-down drag-out 
argument for the truth of one particular doctrine-expressing sentence, the kind 
of argument whose force one cannot preserve sanity and deny. Of this genre are 
some versions of the ontological argument. 
I have suggested that both kinds of apologetic are (or should be) occasional 
and polemical. I mean by this that they are typically occasioned by a specific 
challenge of some kind, or by awareness that the ordered set of sentences for 
which the apologia is being undertaken is not the only one in the field. This, I 
think, is largely the case. But it's also worth noting that, at particular points in 
the history of various traditions, there has been a tendency for apologetics to 
lose its occasional and polemical thrust and to harden into a formalistic intellectual 
discourse, an exercise aimed at showing that a particular set of doctrine-expressing 
sentences is cognitively superior to any other, even when the only competitors 
actually canvassed are the dry relics of long-dead intellectual systems. This was 
certainly often the case in Tibet, where the production of Grub mtha' texts was 
an activity of just this kind, 12 and the same is true of many of the Roman Catholic 
manuals of apologetics. But this is a degenerate form of apologetics, sufficiently 
different in both genre and goals from the kinds of discourse I have in mind to 
warrant no further comment. 
Apologetics also usually uses only methods of argumentation and criteria of 
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knowledge acceptable to the adversary. This to rule out, among other things, 
appeals to authority-sources not recognized by one side in the debate. A Buddhist 
attempt at positive apologetics vis-a-vis Christianity that does nothing other than 
appeal to the word of the Buddha is unlikely to be successful. This restriction 
on methods of argumentation and allowable authority-sources is fully consistent 
with the character of apologetics as an occasional and polemical intellectual 
discipline. 
It remains to explain the thrust of the normative 'should' in the NOlA principle. 
I take this 'should' to be, first and most interestingly, an epistemic 'should.' 
That is, since religious communities characteristically assert the ordered sets of 
sentences that express their doctrines because they take them to be true, it is 
part of their epistemic duty to consider whether a challenging sentence or set of 
such makes it improper to continue asserting what the community asserts. This 
will usually initially involve engagement in some form of negative apologetics-
an attempt to see whether the competing assertion fails in its claims-but it may 
often (and should) pass from there into positive apologetics-the attempt to show 
not only that the attack fails, but that the doctrines of the community being 
attacked are cognitively superior. 
Secondly, the 'should' in the NOlA principle is ethical in a somewhat broader 
sense. That is, religious communities often (though not always and not necessar-
ily) hold that assent to sentences expressing the doctrines of the community is 
of some considerable soteriological significance. Perhaps the strongest imaginable 
soteriological significance that assent to some set of sentences could have is that 
of necessary and sufficient conditionality. Here, the relevant assent would both 
be necessary for the attainment of salvation (if you don't make it you don't get 
it), and sufficient for that attainment (if you do make it you'll certainly get it). 
Very few religious communities (perhaps none) suggest that this relationship 
holds, and for very good reasons. Among them is the obvious fact that, if assent 
to any set of sentences could by itself guarantee salvation, then non-cognitive 
attitudes, including praxis of all kinds, would become religiously irrelevant. This 
is not a position that any religious community happily takes, and it scarcely 
warrants further consideration for the purposes of this study. 
A less strong position, though still one that gives much weight to assent to 
sets of sentences, is that which judges the relevant relation to be one of necessary 
conditionality. This, I think (pace some of the counter-positions to be discussed), 
has been and remains very common in virtually all religious communities. The 
(pseudo)-Athanasian Creed will serve as an excellent example: both in its surface 
logical structure (quicunque vult . .. ) and (probably) in the intent of its framers, 
it strongly presents the position that assent to a lengthy and comparatively well-
defined set of sentences is a necessary condition for the attainment of salvation. 
A weaker position still is that which suggests simply that there is some kind 
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of strong positive link between assenting to some set of doctrine-expressing 
sentences and attaining salvation. Perhaps that the former is helpful for the latter, 
or that it is more helpful than any of its known competitors. This position, too, 
is widely instanced in all religious traditions. For theistic traditions it preserves 
both the importance of assent to the correct sentences and the possibility of 
salvation being attained through such things as unmerited grace in default of 
access to the correct set of doctrine-expressing sentences. 
However exactly the relation between assent to some set of doctrine-expressing 
sentences and the attainment of salvation is conceived, it is beyond doubt that 
virtually all religious communities assert that there is some such relation. Many 
of them also (including virtually all Christian and Buddhist ones) tend to hold 
that the salvation of non-members (those who, inter alia, do not assent to the 
sentences in question) is important. The conclusion that there is thus an ethical 
imperative placed upon such communities to engage in positive apologetics is 
therefore at least suggested. 
The key terms used in the NOlA principle should now be clearer. It is not, I 
take it, an uncontroversial principle, nor without pressing intellectual difficulties 
of its own. Many of its assumptions would be rejected out of hand, for a wide 
variety of reasons, by influential voices in today' s academic theological universe, 
not least by those concerned with inter-religious questions. And so I shall now 
explore what I take to be some of the more important theoretical objections to 
the NOlA principle. 
Challenges to the NOlA Principle 
There are a number of ways in which the NOlA principle can be challenged. 
They fall into three main groups. The first is unwilling to concede any of the 
significant theoretical assumptions of the principle, the second concedes some 
of these assumptions but argues that the situation envisaged by the principle 
rarely or never obtains; the third concedes both the assumptions and the situation, 
but rejects the conclusion. I shall take an example of each group in the comments 
that follow, but first it is necessary to say more about the assumptions at issue. 
Underlying the NOlA principle is the assumption that religious communities 
characteristically do require assent to doctrine-expressing sentences in the sense 
outlined, and that such communities often do consider such assent to be of 
soteriological significance. Underlying it also is the assumption that there are 
such entities as incompatible doctrine-expressing sentences. Both these assump-
tions can be challenged on a variety of grounds. It might be argued, for example, 
that as a matter of fact religious belief and practice has very little to do with 
assent to sets of doctrine-expressing sentences, and that the view that such assent 
has any soteriological significance is a characteristic of the (religiously degener-
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ate) post-enlightenment West. 13 With this view often goes a location of the 
essence of religiosity in feeling-states, attitudes, or even ethical praxis. If a 
position of this kind could be shown, per impossibile, to be convincing, it would 
not entail the falsity of the NOlA principle: it would merely show it to be 
irrelevant. Some brief comments on this view will be offered below, but I shall 
not treat it extensively for reasons that will become clear. 
A more thoroughgoing objection to the assumptions mentioned is that not only 
is it not the case that (empirically) religious communities engage in the activities 
envisaged by the NOlA principle, but that there can (theoretically) be no such 
entities as sets of doctrine-expressing sentences capable of standing in opposition 
one to another, and that, propter hoc, the NOlA principle has no purchase 
because the situation which it envisages can never arise. Theological deconstruc-
tionists would presumably fall into this camp. Even on this view, though, the 
NOlA principle is not false: it is simply a conditional whose antecedent never 
obtains because some of its key terms have no referent. I shall not explore this 
extreme position further here, though I shall pay a good deal of attention to a 
somewhat similar (though much more interesting and sophisticated) model of 
what religious doctrines are and what believing in them means: I refer to that 
developed by George A. Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine. 14 Lindbeck's model 
also rejects the key empirical assumptions upon which the NOlA principle is 
based, and does so for theoretical reasons; it attacks the principle at the same 
level of theoretical significance by apparently rejecting the idea that there can 
be incompatible doctrine-expressing sentences through a denial that such sen-
tences can directly make claims to truth. 
A second group of objections to the NOlA principle concedes the theoretical 
assumption as to the nature of doctrine-expressing sentences and the possibility 
of their conflict, concedes also the empirical assumption that religious com-
munities characteristically do require assent to such things, but denies that as a 
matter of fact such conceptual systems ever come into significant conflict, or 
that, if they do, we have the cognitive equipment to know that they do. There 
is a broad range of positions here. Among them is that of souls sensitive to the 
difficult hermeneutical questions involved in understanding even one set of doc-
trine-expressing sentences, and thus skeptical of the possibility of understanding 
more than one well enough to be sure that significant contradictions among them 
(or any of their members) do in fact obtain. Cautions of this kind, whether from 
philosophers or historians, are important and should be carefully considered; but 
they do not (or do not usually) call the NOlA principle as a whole into question. 
They merely stress the great difficulty of knowing when it obtains and thus when 
it would be appropriate to apply it. 
A more thoroughgoing set of objections to the NOlA principle (one that still 
falls into this second group), is what I shall call a priori pluralism. This is a 
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doctrine that denies the possibility of significant contradiction among doctrine-
expressing sentences because of the application to all of them of some equivalence 
principle. 15 This may be a principle asserting that all sets of doctrine-expressing 
sentences (or at least all those belonging to the world's major religious com-
munities) are (equally) descriptive of the same religious reality; or that they are 
all equally effective in transforming human beings; or some such. Below I shall 
consider one currently influential variant on this position: that of John Hick. 
While lacking either the theoretical interest or the intellectual sophistication of 
Lindbeck's model, a priori pluralism is a very widely held (usually viscerally 
held) theological position; if true, it makes the NOlA principle inapplicable, and 
thus deserves some consideration. 
A third and final cluster of objections to the NOlA principle allows almost 
all of its claims and assumptions, and centers attention instead upon the normative 
'should' in the principle. Typical is the Calvinist objection to natural theology 
in all its forms, an objection especially prominent, for example, in the works of 
Alvin Plantinga and his followers. The point here is that, while it is agreed that 
religious communities characteristically do require assent to sets of doctrine-
expressing sentences and that such sets may and do conflict significantly, it is 
nevertheless inappropriate to suggest that positive apologetics is ever the proper 
response to this situation (although negative apologetics may be recommended). 
This for three reasons: that the standards for successful positive apologetics are 
impossibly high; that the believer is not violating any duties, epistemic or ethical, 
by refusing to engage in it; and that engaging in it suggests an idolatrous attitude 
towards human reason and its capacities. This (set of) objections to the NOlA 
principle is also currently very influential; I shall have no space to explore it 
further here, though I hope to do so in another study in the near future. 
I shall now try to show that two of the most pressing critiques of the NOlA 
principle in fact provide no decisive reasons for rejecting it. And in conclusion 
I shall say more about the importance of the NOlA principle for the Christian 
theological enterprise as it should be practiced in the current situation of radical 
religious pluralism. 
George Lindbeck's Rule-Theory of Religious Doctrine 
Lindbeck's agenda in The Nature of Doctrine is, positively, the development 
of a cultural-linguistic model of what religious doctrines are, a model which 
stresses their regulative functions. Negatively, he is concerned to reject two other 
important models: the cognitive-propositional model and the experiential-expres-
sivist model. The former sees doctrines as propositions, bearers of truth-value 
and conveyors of information about extra-mental and extra-linguistic realities, 16 
while the latter sees them as " ... non informative and nondiscursive symbols 
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of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations. ."17 In rejecting the 
cognitive-propositional model of religious doctrines Lindbeck seems to call the 
NOlA principle into question: for if doctrine-expressing sentences cannot make 
direct claims to tmth but can function only regulatively within the bounds of 
specific communities, then they cannot be directly incompatible. Since this is 
the main significance of Lindbeck's position for the purposes of this paper, I 
shall focus most of my attention in the remarks that follow upon what he has to 
say about the cognitive-propositional view. But some brief remarks upon why 
he takes experiential-expressivism to be an inadequate interpretation of the nature 
of doctrine are also in order. 
Lindbeck suggests that experiential expressivists typically take doctrine-expres-
sing sentences!8 to express core religious experiences. The relation between 
religious experience and religious doctrine on this view is one-way: the former 
produces the latter. As Lindbeck correctly points out, this view flies in the face 
of all that we know from historical and anthropological studies of the complex 
phenomenon of becoming and remaining a member of a religious community. 
These studies show, I think decisively, that there is an exceedingly complex 
symbiotic and reciprocal relationship between experience and doctrine; each 
conditions the other, but if there is a dominant direction of influence it is from 
doctrine to experience, not vice-versa. Assent to a given set of doctrine-expressing 
sentences (together, of course, with the legends, myths, rituals, practices, and 
so forth that accompany it) makes possible the occurrence of certain kinds of 
experience, and may at times act as both necessary and sufficient condition for 
the occurrence of that experience.!9 Religion, on the cultural-linguistic view, is 
thus like a language, an idiom,20 and becoming religious is "to interiorize a set 
of skills by practice and training."2! Lindbeck is entirely correct that the weight 
of contemporary developmental psychology (Piaget and after), much of contem-
porary philosophy (especially since Wittgenstein's critique of the possibility of 
a private language), almost all current anthropological theory (Clifford Geertz 
et at.), and much oflinguistics and cognitive science,22 is in support of a cultural-
linguistic model and against an experiential-expressivist one. Theologians and 
historians of religion (especially those of the Chicago school) are perhaps among 
the last important intellectual groups for whom the insights of these disciplines 
have still to be absorbed. They have not yet been able to exorcise Schleiermacher's 
ghost. 
Lindbeck's rejection of experiential-expressivism is, then, to be applauded. 
But, as he realizes, the rejection of experiential-expressivism and its replacement 
by some form of cultural-linguistic theory does not by itself entail (or even 
suggest) the rejection of a propositional theory of what (at least some) doctrine-
expressing sentences are. 23 It may still be the case that some doctrine-expressing 
sentences represent propositions and bear truth-value. And at this point we come 
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to the question of truth, a question that Lindbeck raises explicitly in his third 
chapter. Here he distinguishes two kinds of truth" corresponding to the two 
views of religious doctrine that he considers to be serious options: the cognitive-
propositional and the cultural-linguistic. On the first view, to say of a religious 
doctrine that it is true is to say that the natural-language sentence which expresses 
it corresponds to reality. So, for example, when a Buddhist says everything that 
exists is momentary, the proposition thus expressed is true if and only if everything 
that exists is momentary. On the second (cultural-linguistic) view of religious 
doctrines truth is a property not of propositions but of the categories of systems: 
a religious conceptual system is true if and only if the categories that constitute 
it make reference to "whatever is in fact more important than anything else in 
the universe"25 a possibility. That is, if by using these categories one can talk 
about whatever the object of religious discourse is taken to be, then the system 
by which they are constituted is categorially true. On this view, it would seem, 
one would have to interpret the Buddhist assertion just mentioned as a categorial 
assertion, an assertion that a given category (and only that category) should be 
employed in order to make meaningful reference to religious reality. It should 
be understood, that is, as a rule whose content can be paraphrased, roughly, as 
it is incumbent upon the Buddhist religious community to use the category of 
momentariness in talking about reality. 
Now, if this is Lindbeck's view, his stress on the importance of seeing religious 
doctrines as idioms, as cultural-linguistic systems that generate categories and 
provide rules for which category is to be used when, does not make it impossible 
that some doctrine-expressing sentences may also make claims to the kind of 
truth possessed by (what Lindbeck calls) first-order propositions, and may thus 
oppose one another as the NOlA principle suggests. More broadly, Lindbeck's 
position is both defensible and illuminating if all he wants to claim is that some 
(perhaps even many) doctrine-expressing sentences function for religious com-
munities primarily as rules. But further arguments are needed if the stronger 
thesis that all doctrine-expressing sentences function only regulatively for all 
religious communities is to hold. 
At times, Lindbeck does seem to want to go just this far. He says, for example, 
that the regulative, the marking-out of proper categories for the use of the 
community, is the only job that church doctrines do. 26 In order to see exactly 
what is at issue here something needs to be said about Lindbeck's technical 
'Excursus on Religion and Truth. '27 He begins here by making a distinction 
between intrasystematic truth and ontological truth. The former is the truth that 
given utterances have in virtue of their coherence "with the total relevant con-
text."28 A religious utterance is thus intrasystematically true if and only if it 
coheres with all other utterances, attitudes and practices in the religious form of 
life within which it occurs. By contrast, an utterance is ontologically true if and 
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only if it corresponds to extra-categorial reality. Lindbeck then claims that, for 
any given religious utterance, intrasystematic truth is a necessary condition for 
ontological truth. He uses the striking example of a crusader uttering the sentence 
christus est dominus while lopping off the head of an infidel, and claims that 
the intrasystematic incoherence of the utterance with the action makes the former 
false. 29 Conversely, the utterance may be true if spoken in a situation wherein 
it coheres with the total context. This elevation of intrasystematic truth to the 
status of a necessary condition for ontological truth is, on the face of it, odd. 
Certainly, if applied to other forms of discourse it leads to manifest absurdities;30 
it would seem preferable to say not that the crusader's utterance is false, but 
that it fails as a religious utterance. 31 I suspect, however, that Lindbeck's reasons 
for making this apparently implausible claim about the logical relations between 
intrasystematic and ontological truth have to do with his view that a religious 
utterance can have ontological truth (that is, a correspondence between what is 
expressed in the utterance and reality) "only insofar as it is a performance, an 
act or deed which helps create that correspondence. "32 It's significant that 
Lindbeck uses the term 'utterance' throughout the 'Excursus': he does so because 
he wishes to assert that sentences forming part of religious conceptual systems 
can possess ontological truth only when uttered in an appropriately faith-centred 
confessional setting. 33 This, he says, is because only in such settings can "religious 
utterances" gain sufficient referential specificity to be capable of expressing 
propositions and thus of possessing ontological truth. A corollary of this view 
is the position (worked out at length in chapters 4-5) that confessional language 
is first-order discourse while the language of technical theology is second-order 
discourse. The former (and only the former) is capable of expressing propositions, 
while the latter provides and organizes the categories (the grammar and syntax) 
that govern which assertions may be made. Church doctrine (technical theology) 
thus becomes entirely regulative in function, while truth-claims are made only 
in and through confessional utterance. 
It seems worth pursuing some of the implications of this view. To restate the 
position formally: a religious utterance becomes a true first-order proposition for 
Lindbeck if and only if all of the following four conditions are met: (i) That the 
utterance in question is spoken in a context wherein it is intrasystematically true; 
(ii) That the utterance in question is part of a conceptual system which is categorially 
true; (iii) That the utterance in question is given voice to in an appropriate confes-
sional context; and (iv) That reality is as the utterance in question says it is. All of 
these conditions except the third can be met by the doctrine-expressing sentences 
found in technical theological texts. 
Why then, in Lindbeck's view, is this third condition so necessary? He offers 
two reasons, one (in the 'Excursus') explicit but confused; the other, somewhat 
more compelling, implicit throughout the book and coming to the surface in the 
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final chapter. 34 To take the first reason first: Lindbeck argues (as already men-
tioned) that a necessary condition for the possession of ontological truth by any 
given religious utterance is that the utterance in question be performative. By 
this, following J. L. Austin,35 he means that a religious utterance must, in order 
to be ontologically truthful, create a new reality. Suppose the Nicene Creed is 
recited by a believer in an appropriate liturgical setting: this act may certainly 
be regarded in Austinian terms as an instance of uttering performatively. It may 
be understood as constituting a new relationship between two previously-existing 
relata: the worshiper and God. In this it fits the structure of Austin's more homely 
examples (apologies, marriage vows, etc.). But it cannot be understood as con-
stituting or bringing into existence either of the two relata to whom its utterance 
relates. God exists (if God does) before the utterance, with all of God's essential 
properties (if God has any), just as God does after the utterance. So does the 
worshiper. What is changed (newly constituted) is the relation between them. 
But if this is all that is meant by categorizing religious utterance as performative, 
not enough has been said to support Lindbeck's third requirement for the posses-
sion of ontological truth by a religious utterance-that such an utterance be given 
voice to in an appropriate confessional context. This is so because among the 
conditions for the efficacy of every performative religious utterance is the truth 
of some more-or-Iess specifiable non-performative doctrine-expressing sentences. 
In the case under consideration these would include there is a God who made 
heaven and earth and there is an utterer of religious utterances who is other 
than God-and so forth. 
To generalize: in order for any performative utterance (religious or otherwise) 
to function as such, what is expressed by some set of non-performative utterances 
must be ontologically true. To suggest, as Lindbeck does, that only sentences 
uttered confessionally and with performative function can possess ontological 
truth is thus confused. 
Lindbeck's use of Austin's category is therefore quite insufficient for the task 
he wishes it to perform. It suggests, in fact, not that confessional utterance 
possesses ontological truth because of its performativity, but rather that (following 
Austin) ontological truth is never a property of performative utterance,36 and, 
propter hoc, never a property of performative confessional utterance. None of 
this, of course, is to say that performative utterance is uninteresting or religiously 
insignificant; only that it can't, by its very nature, possess ontological truth in 
Lindbeck's sense. 
Lindbeck does offer (or at least suggest) another set of reasons for the necessity 
of his third condition on a given religious utterance possessing ontological truth. 
This, if I correctly understand his remarks on intratextuality and skill37 and his 
references to the work of Hans Frei on the importance of narrative,3S is that only 
by fully entering into the lebensform that constitutes a p·articular religious com-
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munity can one understand the doctrine-expressing sentences of that community 
with sufficient richness and precision to be able to utter them with enough 
referential specificity to give them the possibility of possessing ontological truth. 
Further, the key terms of the doctrine-expressing sentences in question are given 
their content largely in and through the use of narratives (hence the significance 
of Hans Frei's work).'9 How can one know Buddha without knowing the Jiitaka 
stories? How can one know God without knowing that "vast, loosely-structured, 
non-fictional novel"40 that Christians call the Bible? Theologizing, claims 
Lindbeck, must thus be done "intratextually," in the sense that what normatively 
constrains it is an agreed text. Briefly, and perhaps more crudely than Lindbeck 
would like, members of religious communities need their stories in order to tell 
them to whom (or to what) their religious utterances refer. 
It's hard to disagree with this. But it's equally hard to see that it's terribly 
significant. That exposure to and faith in certain stories is a necessary condition 
for understanding (and even for properly making) religious utterances is surely 
an important psychological truth for most members of most religious com-
munities; but it is equally obviously not a logical truth. If it were the latter, then 
I, as a member of a Christian community, could neither fully understand nor 
properly assert (or deny) any Buddhist doctrine-expressing sentences. And the 
result would be both relativism and fideism: religious communities as closed, 
impermeable, incommensurable forms of life. 
Lindbeck recognizes this, and recognizes it as a problem. 4 ! He wishes to 
preserve his cultural-linguistic view of doctrine-expressing sentences as purely 
regulative in function (when used non-confessionally), and as not fully com-
prehensible to the outsider, and yet still allow both the possibility of and (at 
times) the necessity for an "ad hoc apologetic"42 directed towards outsiders. His 
model for how such an ad hoc apologetic might function is catechetical: the 
non-member can only be made a member by a full process of acculturation-
catechesis in a rich sense, including exposure to the relevant narratives, practices 
and so forth. Ad hoc apologetics, for Lindbeck, offers a form of life; it is 
successful if and only if the recipient of the offer enters the form of life. Lindbeck 
further thinks that the significance of rational argumentation in all of this (of 
apologetics as envisaged by the NOlA principle) is vanishingly small.43 
Two points need to be made. First, even if Lindbeck is correct in all of his 
contentions about the practical importance of narrative, intratextuality, and 
catechesis for both the enterprise of fully understanding religious utterances and 
the enterprise of creating new members of religious communities, he offers no 
new arguments here for their logical necessity. Nothing in his final chapter 
suggests that a given doctrine-expressing sentence cannot possess ontological 
truth (or be fully comprehended) outside the (almost) closed, intratextually con-
stituted, circle of a particular religious lebensform. Much of it suggests that such 
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sentences are very often not fully understood outside the circle, but that is a 
very different matter from claiming that they cannot be. Secondly, it's very 
revealing that the person at whom Lindbeck's intratextual, catechetical apologetic 
is aimed is never the intellectually sophisticated passionately committed member 
of another religious community. 44 Rather, it's the dechristianized postliberal 
secular individual. The catechetical model of apologetics is most intuitively 
appropriate in such cases because it can be seen as filling a void, a need. It loses 
almost all of its force when placed into the inter-religious context under consid-
eration here. Lindbeck's discussion-partner is still the non-believer, not the 
other-believer. 
In conclusion: Lindbeck's rejection of experiential-expressivism is entirely 
justified. His use of cultural-linguistic models of religion is also very fruitful, 
both for our understanding of how religious doctrine (often) functions in com-
munities and in the life of the believer, and for our understanding of how one 
becomes and remains a member of a religious community. But Lindbeck's 
espousal of cultural-linguistic models does not require (or even suggest) that 
only confessional religious utterances can be ontologically true, or that all doc-
trinal formulations are regulative. The doctrine-expressing sentences of an aver-
agely sophisticated religious community can still (and should still) be seen as 
capable of bearing truth. This in no way hinders their ability to function as rules. 
Taking this view also leaves open the possibility of interesting empirical enquiries 
into the question of how specific doctrine-expressing sentences do in fact function 
for specific religious communities. I suspect, contra Lindbeck, that there is no 
useful a priori answer to this question; it is likely that some doctrine-expressing 
sentences function both regulatively and propositionally for some religious com-
munities, some only regulatively, and some only propositionally. Those parts, 
then, of Lindbeck's rule-theory that can be defended do not require the rejection 
of inter-religious apologetics, positive or negative; the NOlA principle thus 
stands. 
A Priori Pluralism 
Perhaps the most vocal and visible proponent of this view in recent years has 
been the British theologian John Hick. 45 While not notable for the rigor with 
which it is stated and argued for, and thus rather difficult to give a precise 
delineation of, the view may be characterized roughly as follows: (i) That the 
central doctrine-expressing sentences of all major religious communities have as 
their ultimate referent the same ultimately significant religious reality; (ii) That 
these doctrine-expressing sentences operate within the context of a religious 
life-world (a "religious totality" as Hick often puts it) as aids in the transformation 
of the believer: they, together with their associated practices, myths, stories, 
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institutions, and so forth, mediate religious reality to human beings and thus 
transform their lives; (iii) That all the major world religions-and thus also all 
the sets of doctrine-expressing sentences espoused by those religions-are equally 
effective in mediating religious reality and in transforming for the better the lives 
of those who adhere to them. 
These views apply an equivalence-principle to all doctrine-expressing sen-
tences. 46 They require that there actually is a single religiously ultimate reality, 
and that it is of a kind capable of effective mediation through a wide variety of 
incompatible sentences. It means, to take an example from Buddhism and Chris-
tianity, that ultimate reality must be such that it can be characterized both as a 
set of evanescent instantaneous events connected to one another by specifiable 
causes but without any substantial independent existence, and as an eternal 
changeless divine personal substance. While it may not be impossible to construct 
some picture of ultimate reality which meets these demands, it is far from easy 
to see how it might be done. The a priori nature of the position is evident from 
the fact that no empirical evidence as to the extent of incompatibilities among 
doctrine-expressing sentences is allowed to count against its truth. 
What one usually finds in the writings of pluralistic thinkers on the question 
of how it is that the same ultimate reality can be characterized in apparently 
contradictory ways is a bow in the direction of ineffability-since the ultimate 
reality transcends all our characterizations of it, we have to make a fundamental 
distinction between it as it is an sich and it as it is apprehended by US. 47 While 
it may indeed be the case that ultimate reality is, in and of itself, just the kind 
of thing that can be characterized and mediated in the ways suggested above, 
the prior probability of this being true seems distressingly low; some powerful 
collateral reasons to support it are needed. 
Hick does offer some collateral reasons. First, he gives an ex post Jacto 
justification of (irs possibility which assumes its truth. This usually has the 
following form: if there really is a single transcendent reality one would expect 
human characterizations and descriptions of it to differ, perhaps even, allowing 
for the radical effects of contingent social and cultural factors upon such concep-
tualization and description, to differ drastically. So the fact that we do find such 
drastically differing descriptions of the putative ultimate reality is not troubling. 
Then there are a couple of reasons given for (irs desirability. The first of 
these has to do with world harmony: if everyone becomes convinced of the truth 
of (i) then missionaries will pack their bags, Jews, Muslims, and Christians will 
stop fighting one another in the Middle East, Buddhists and Hindus will stop 
fighting one another in Sri Lanka, and the world will become a much happier 
and more habitable place. There is also the suggestion that the sincere and 
committed believer of any particular religious community often meets sincere 
and convinced believers of other communities in whom, as Hick puts it, "the 
414 Faith and Philosophy 
fruits of openness to the divine Reality are gloriously apparent."4' 
None of these collateral reasons is able to do the work it needs to do. While 
it is probably true that much of the violence and bloodshed in the world has 
something to do with religious hatred, broadly understood, this is not by itself 
a sufficient reason to deny that instances of such disagreement are cognitively 
significant. And the recognition that there are good, sincere and apparently 
grace-filled individuals in all religious communities does not in any way require 
that there be no substantive cognitive conflicts among the truth-claims of those 
traditions. 
There are other, and perhaps more severe, problems with a priori pluralism 
as I have defined it. I shall note only two. First, there is the problem of criteria 
for exclusion. The thrust of the position is to remove the need for excluding as 
false or inadequate any doctrine-expressing sentence of significance to any com-
munity. And yet this leads rather rapidly to very undesirable conclusions. Con-
sider, for example, the case of the Jonestown massacre: the reverend Jim Jones 
built up a devoted following in California in the 1970s, and then led the faithful 
off to await the coming of the kingdom in Guiana. While there the community 
appears to have degenerated into paranoia and fear, and ended with the founder 
instructing his followers to drink cyanide. Some complied willingly; others were 
forced. The end result was the agonizing death of hundreds. What does the a 
priori pluralist say about such a case? She would presumably want to exclude 
a sentence of the form God is such that God wants God's followers to drink 
cyanide now as being properly descriptive of the ultimate reality; presumably, 
also, this sentence is not to be regarded as on a par with God was in Christ 
reconciling the world to himself as a means of mediating the ultimate reality to 
human beings and transforming the quality of their lives. And yet in order to 
make such nice distinctions the a priori pluralist must construct criteria for 
separating appropriate affirmations about the ultimate reality from inappropriate 
ones. He must, in other words, enter into apologetical discourse whether he likes 
it or not. 
There are some signs in Hick's recent work that he is prepared to countenance 
the suggestion that some doctrine-expressing sentences must be rejected, as must 
some religious forms of life. But his suggestions as to criteria by which this may 
be done are thin. Some religious communities, apparently, constitute an effective 
context of transformation, while others do not. But we are never told how to 
distinguish the former from the latter, nor what arguments may be brought to 
bear in support of the distinctions we must make. Hick's lack of interest in this 
matter comes directly from the inner logic of his position: his a priori pluralism 
was constructed in an attempt to get away from the need to make such invidious 
distinctions. To attempt a rational justification of the distinctions that even a 
pluralist like Hick must make would be to re-enter the apologetical arena, and 
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since doing this is abhorrent to him, the distinctions are made but not argued for. 
To take one example: Hick's position would seem to entail, if taken seriously, 
that any religious community which claims cognitive superiority for its set of 
doctrine-expressing sentences over that of another religious tradition must be 
making a false claim. Yet to assert this is precisely to claim that some of the 
doctrine-expressing sentences of some religious communities are false; and such 
an interesting and potentially religiously divisive assertion cries out for justifica-
tion through argument, justification which Hick seems not to want to provide. 
It is, perhaps, worth offering a comment on the likely reasons for the current 
popularity of theological perspectives that fit under the pluralist umbrella. 49 It is 
a characteristically Western postwar perspective. It is almost impossible to find 
hardline a priori pluralists in either the Buddhist or Christian tradition in any 
other place or time. It is probably that the major historical reason for the emergence 
of this current of thought in our time is a profound (and justified) postcolonialist 
guilt on the part of sensitive Western Christian intellectuals. Some atrocities 
have been committed in the name of the Christian faith; others with the silent 
connivance of Christians. We know it and want to distance ourselves from it, 
to ensure that it doesn't happen again. Adoption of the pluralist perspective 
seems a way of ensuring at least that Western colonialist aggression doesn't get 
out of hand and become too intimately linked (as it often has been in the past) 
with Christian theology. These goals are admirable, but there are other and better 
ways to atone for our reprehensible past than the adoption of incoherent philosoph-
ical positions in the present. 
A priori pluralism would, if true, seriously threaten the NOlA principle. It 
would make significant clash among the doctrine-expressing sentences of different 
religious communities effectively impossible, and would thus make the apologet-
ical response (positive or negative) completely inappropriate. But, as I have tried 
to show, a priori pluralism is, prima facie, a massively implausible position, 
and the collateral arguments offered for its truth do not go far enough towards 
remedying this implausibility. The NOlA principle thus stands. 
Conclusions 
My conclusions will be brief. I have tried to show that the NOlA principle 
can stand against some of the major criticisms which are usually brought against 
it. Even if I have been successful in this, I have not, of course, shown that the 
principle is true. It remains to say something about the principle's significance 
for contemporary Christian theological thinking about non-Christian traditions. 50 
I take it to have important, though limited, applications. It comes into operation 
only when the situation described by the principle obtains, and there is, as I've 
suggested, much careful historical work to be done before one can be sure, in 
416 Faith and Philosophy 
a given case, that the situation does obtain. But when the necessary careful 
historical and hermeneutical work has been done, when representative intellec-
tuals of a particular religious community arrive at the conclusion that there is 
indeed a prima facie case of incompatibility, the NOlA principle should be 
applied. 
Recognition of the principle, together with its application where appropriate, 
is, however, not exhaustively descriptive of the Christian theological task in a 
religiously pluralistic world. It is, rather, a relatively minor part of this task, 
and it in no sense precludes or excludes the constructive enterprise of comparative 
theology. The NOlA principle simply represents one modality under which 
theological thinking in a religiously plural context must operate if it is to stay 
honest. It is also a modality which brings with it some great practical benefits: 
it is one of the most useful ways available to a theologian of learning about the 
internal intellectual dynamics of a tradition other than her own. Intellectual 
challenge and the response it brings is almost always more productive of under-
standing and knowledge than the pallid, platitudinous, degutted discourse in 
which so much contemporary inter-religious 'dialogue' consists. So there are 
pragmatic as well as purely theoretical reasons for a proper recognition and 
application of the NOlA principle. 
There is also, given the regnant intellectual orthodoxies among academic 
theologians on the question of how theology should be done in a religiously 
plural context (some of them discussed in this paper), a real need for an apologia 
for apologetics. It is this need that this paper has tried to fill. But the task of 
developing a responsible apologetic, both positive and negative, is one that has 
scarcely yet been begun in any religious community. The primary desiderata for 
its future development are: first, the acquisition of more, and more accurate, 
knowledge by the intellectual representatives of all religious communities con-
cerning the doctrine-expressing sentences of other communities. In meeting this 
need historians ofreligion, area-studies specialists, philologists, religious studies 
experts, and so forth, all have a very important part to play. Second, there is a 
need for the development of appropriately sophisticated theoretical frameworks 
for the comparative analysis of complex conceptual systems, such as those set 
forth in the sets of doctrine-expressing sentences belonging to the world's major 
religious traditions. There is much to be learned here from theoretical develop-
ments in the philosophy of science ,51 and there are some suggestive contributions 
by a few philosophers of religion. 52 But there are very few attempts to apply 
these theoretical contributions to instances of the kind envisaged by the NOlA 
principle. 
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